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  According to previous research, the tendency is for diversified companies to 
perform better the higher the relatedness of their businesses. This can be 
understood as resulting from the benefit in terms of monitoring, in that executives 
can more easily evaluate related businesses, and also the benefit in terms of 
organizational capability, in that the company can jointly use its excellent 
resources between related businesses.  
  However, when executives seek synergies between businesses within the same 
company to increase company-wide profit, it is possible that they will also obstruct 
their company’s long-term growth. In this study, this phenomenon is called “the 
synergy-seeking trap” and this paper’s objective is to clarify its mechanism. 
 
1. Introduction   
 Currently, Japanese electronics companies are rapidly conducting organizational 
reviews. For example, in 2014 Sony announced it was selling its VAIO business and 
spinning-off its television business. Furthermore, in the same year Panasonic spun-
off its semiconductor business and intellectual property-related business. In 2015, 
Sony announced that it was spinning-off all of its businesses, while Sharp is 
investigating spinning-off its LCD business. Conversely, U.S. companies are 
pursuing selection and concentration. In 2014, IBM sold its x86 server business and 
semiconductor manufacturing business, and in 2015, GE announced that it was to 
sell its financial unit, which accounts for around 30% of its total sales. In such ways, 
currently companies are not only reviewing the management resources they 
possess, but also promoting restructuring through reviewing their corporate 
boundaries.  
 Research on companies’ diversification and their horizontal boundaries has been 
conducted in the fields of strategic management and economics. In many cases, 
strategic management research has justified diversification from the perspectives 
of the economies of scope, the diversified use of internal resources, and synergies. In 
particular, the resource-based view (RBV) theory has placed importance on holding 
internal resources that is impossible for other companies to imitate. Currently, 
rather than stressing “holding” resources, the mainstream in organizational 
capabilities research (the capabilities approach) stresses the importance of having 
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the capability to “use” resources inside and outside of the organization. However, a 
problem with the capabilities approach is that it focuses only on an organization’s 
allocation of resources and does not sufficiently consider the issue of its incentives.  
 On the other hand, researchers in financial economics have pointed to the 
diversification discount. This is the fact that the corporate value of diversified 
companies tends to be lower than that of specialized companies, and the inefficiency 
of diversified companies has been clarified from the perspectives of an organization’s 
allocation of resources and its incentives. Specifically, because there is information 
asymmetry between diversified companies’ executives and division managers, the 
division managers aim to ensure the survival of their own division and an allocation 
of resources favorable to them, and there is room for them to take an inefficient 
approach toward executives. In this way, the behavior of division managers may 
distort diversified companies’ allocation of resources and obstructs the executives’ 
efficient allocation of resources, giving rise to the phenomenon known as the 
diversification discount (Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan et al. 2000).  
 In this research, the fact that diversified companies with business relatedness can 
become inefficient is explained not from the perspective of the inefficient behavior 
of division managers, but from the perspective of executives seeking synergies. The 
framework presented in this study not only provides a new viewpoint for research 
on diversified companies, it should also provide some clues toward understanding 
companies current organizational restructuring, such as their company spin-offs 
and sales of businesses. Accordingly, the structure of this paper is as follows.  
 In the next section, we will consider the resource-based view theory and the 
capabilities approach that focuses on the resources held by companies and also on 
usable resources. From this, we will see that it is necessary to consider not only the 
allocation of resources, but also incentives. In Section 3, we will examine studies in 
financial economics that simultaneously took into consideration the allocation of 
resources and incentives, and describe the previous research that showed the 
inefficiency of the internal capital market in diversified companies. In Section 4, we 
will clarify that the internal capital market can be inefficient from a perspective that 
is different to that taken in previous research on the internal capital market and 
diversification discount–namely, from the perspective of executives seeking 
synergies–and then finally offer some conclusions.  
 
2. The resource-based view and organizational capabilities approach 
 The importance of management resources held by companies was noted in the 
research development known as the resource-based view (RBV) within the research 
on strategic management(1). But subsequently, it also came to be recognized that 
holding resources has a reverse function, in that the resources that may contribute 
to the competitive advantage of a company may also conversely invite rigidity into 
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its organization. Therefore today, attention has become focused on organizational 
capabilities, which is the importance of whether the resources held by a company 
can be effectively used for a competitive advantage.  
 In particular, with the opportunity provided by the study of Teece et al. (1997), 
research has advanced on the dynamic capabilities framework, which focuses on 
the capability of the organization to modify its usable resource base in a manner 
compatible with its environment. Specifically, in this framework it has been pointed 
out that it necessary for companies to modify its usable resource base through 
investment decisions by executives (diversification), the use of other companies’ 
management resources (strategic collaborations), and the sale of resources that are 
not environmentally compatible (Helfat et al. 2007, Teece 2009).  
 According to the dynamic capabilities framework, what are important when 
executives modify the resource base are the concepts of co-specification and 
orchestration. Here, the concept of co-specification refers to when multiple economic 
agents carry out relation-specific investment, while the concept of orchestration is 
the harmonious organization (orchestration) of resources toward this co-
specification. Organization entails not only the modification of an environmentally 
compatible and usable resource base inside and outside of an organization; it also 
makes it possible to establish a sustainable competitive advantage through creating 
a new business model that is advantageous to that company and to change its 
competitive environment.  
 But a problem with the dynamic capabilities framework is that it does not 
sufficiently consider an organization’s incentives for holding and re-allocating its 
resources. Therefore, it can explain the efficiency (or inefficiency) of diversified 
companies only from the perspective of the allocation of resources and cannot 
understand it from the perspective of incentives. Yet it is necessary to focus not only 
on an organization’s allocation of resources, but also on the issue of its incentives. 
For example, if business division A holds resources and executives intend to transfer 
them to business division B, business division A will probably resist this. Also, this 
sort of transfer of resources is likely to change the interests between the various 
economic agents, and therefore the issues of the allocation of resources and 
incentives should be considered at the same time.  
 
3. Previous research on inefficiency in diversified companies:  
the internal capital market and the diversification discount 
 In this section, based on the previous research on diversified companies’ 
economies of scope, synergy seeking, use of management resources, internal capital 
market, and executives’ inefficient decision making, we will see how diversified 
companies can become inefficient from the perspective of the incentives for division 
managers and executives.  
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 First, economies of scope expresses the fact that costs can be reduced when 
multiple businesses are operating based on a single company compared to when 
these multiple businesses are each operating independently. On the other hand, 
synergy is a broader concept than economies of scope, and refers to the synergies–
namely, the improved performance–that can be obtained when multiple business 
divisions are combined together. Particularly in the context of corporate acquisitions, 
in many cases the motivation for an acquisition is seeking synergies. But it has been 
noted that many of them are lost after the acquisition when the organizations are 
integrated, the expected synergies are not obtained, and corporate value is reduced 
(Sirower 1997).  
 Next, we will consider the company-wide utilization of management resources 
from the perspectives of physical resources, human resources, financial resources, 
and organization capabilities. In particular, one benefit of a company’s 
diversification is considered to be that executives can effectively use the knowledge 
and expertise within the organization (Teece 1982). But conversely, Williamson 
(1975) explained the superiority of the allocation of resources by executives in a 
divisionalized organization (the internal capital market) compared to that by the 
external capital markets, as executives have an advantage in terms of the 
monitoring and control of each of the businesses. 
 In the field of corporate finance, since the second half of the 1990s the inefficiency 
of the internal capital market has been clarified both theoretically and empirically(2). 
In particular, research has been carried out on the diversification discount, in which 
diversified companies suffer more of a fall in corporate value than specialized 
companies. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) noted that as the productivity between 
business divisions is different, it is possible that managers in divisions with low 
productivity spend not a little time on non-productive activities (rent-seeking) for 
the survival of their own division. They called the phenomenon of the central 
headquarters inefficiently allocating resources in order to alleviate the rent seeking 
by business divisions the “socialism of the internal capital market”.  
 In addition, Rajan et al. (2000) clarified the inefficiency of the internal capital 
market. They assumed a situation of incomplete contracts and presented a power 
seeking model in which highly productive business divisions do not behave 
efficiently, but instead engage in defensive activities in order to gain bargaining 
power for the company-wide allocation of resources. In their model also, the same 
as in Scharfstein and Stein (2000), the greater the difference in investment 
opportunities between business divisions, the more inefficient the internal capital 
market. Rajan et al. (2000) obtained findings through empirical research that were 
consistent with this theoretical model. 
 To summarize the research on the internal capital market, the reasons why 
diversified companies become inefficient are that the division managers of highly 
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productive divisions engage in inefficient activities in order to protect their resources, 
and that the division managers of unproductive divisions engage in inefficient 
activities in order to ensure the survival of their division. Therefore, if we exclude 
the issue of the executives of each business being inferior in terms of information to 
division managers, rather than being a problem of executives, the inefficiency of 
diversified companies can be interpreted as a problem of division managers not 
engaging in optimal behavior. So it has been considered that the higher the 
relevancy of the businesses, the easier it is for executives to evaluate between 
business divisions, and also the easier it is for them to seek synergies, and therefore 
the inefficiency of the internal capital market is reduced (it becomes efficient). But 
in this research, we have noted that the higher the relevancy between businesses, 
the more executives are tempted to seek synergies, and that this may obstruct 
business divisions from engaging in optimal behavior.  
 Inefficiency in diversified companies derived from executives is often explained as 
corporate empire building and entrenchment (self protection) by executives 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Corporate empire building is the tendency of executives 
to want to maximize the corporate scale, as through this expansion of corporate 
scale they obtain the benefits of an increase in the number of posts for employee 
promotions and also the acquisition of a louder voice in society (acquisition of social 
prestige). Entrenchment signifies that the executives are able to protect their own 
position through investing in projects that are vital for themselves; for example, 
even if it is not a project that will benefit their company, they invest in the project 
that is vital for the interests of the executives themselves. Executives may cite the 
goal of “seeking synergies” in order to justify their own opportunistic behavior of 
corporate empire building and entrenchment(3). 
 
4. The synergy seeking of executives that obstructs the optimal behavior of 
business divisions  
 As was explained in the previous section, even if the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that executives give the reason of seeking synergies as an excuse for their 
opportunistic behavior, next in this research we will loosen this assumption and 
assume that executives seek to maximize profit for the company as a whole. We will 
assume that profits for the company as a whole increase through executives seeking 
synergies between related businesses. In this way, “synergy seeking” subsequently 
in this paper refers to executives’ seeking synergies without having any bad 
intentions (namely, they do not behave opportunistically) in order to contribute to 
the profits of the company as a whole. As it is easy to observe synergy seeking that 
worsens profits for the company as a whole, such as corporate empire building, this 
type of synergy seeking is not considered to be the issue here. Instead, we will focus 
on an issue that is not so easy to observe, which is the type of synergy seeking that  
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attempts to increase profits for the company as a whole, and we will attempt to 
clarify its darker aspects. 
 We will assume that a company has two related business, A and B. As is shown 
in ① in the figure, the current situation is that business division A is profitable and 
has a dominant position within its industry, but business division B is 
uncompetitive and is recording a deficit of －γ. Next, we will assume that executives  
seek synergies. By business division B, which is a related to business division A,  
adopting the technologies of business division A (collaborating with it), we will 
assume that while the profits of business division A are unchanged, business 
division B becomes profitable (② in the figure). Therefore, through this sort of 
synergy seeking, profits in the company as a whole increase. 
 But this increase in profits was achieved by a collaboration not between business 
division A, which possesses superior technologies, and a competitor to business 
division B, but by a collaboration with business division B that is within the same 
company, and is an increase in profits only for business division B (β＋γ). Let’s 
suppose that business division A’s partner in the collaboration was not business 
division B, but a competitor of business division B that was superior to it. In this 
case, the profits of business division A further increase and it can achieve growth (③ 
in the figure). In other words, in the collaboration with business division B, business 
division A sacrifices the profits (α) it would have obtained through a collaboration 
with an external partner, and instead only business division B obtains profits β. 
While this is beneficial if viewed from the position of the company as a whole and 
business division B, it means that business division A, which possesses high growth 
potential, is not able to fully realize this potential. In particular, if α＜β＋γ, 
② Synergy seeking 
③ Selection and concentration 
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executives seeks synergies from the related business divisions that will contribute 
to the profits of the company as a whole. But as a consequence, business division A 
cannot pursue growth to the greatest extent possible and it is possible that it will 
subsequently lose its dominant position to a competitor. Supposing that business 
division A was a specialized company, it would not seek to collaborate with the 
uncompetitive business division B and instead would probably be able to maintain 
its dominant position through collaborating with another company. In this study, 
this is considered to be the origin of the diversification discount.  
 In order to mitigate the diversification discount, it is necessary to spin-off 
unprofitable business division B and reduce its relevancy with business division A. 
Alternatively, if the company withdrew from business B and invested the gains from 
the sale of this business into the growth of business division A, it is likely that this 
would increase the productivity of business division A and enable it to maintain its 
dominant position in the industry in the long run. The former explains the trend 
toward company spin-offs among Japanese companies in recent years, while the 
latter explains the trend toward selection and concentration among U.S. companies. 
If a collaboration between business division A and an external organization is 
facilitated, then this division will probably become capable of further growth 
through the open innovation in the market and may create a new business model.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 As synergy seeking by the executives of diversified companies prioritizes benefit 
for the company as a whole through closed innovation within the company, it can 
obstruct the open innovation of business division A. In particular, in industries that 
are still developing market capabilities, as has been clarified in this research, even 
if executives’ synergy seeking results in profits for the company in the short term, 
we have to be aware of the possibility that it will obstruct its long-term survival and 
growth. We consider that this study’s framework is effective toward understanding 
why Japanese electronics companies have lagged behind in reviewing their 
corporate boundaries and in carrying out selection and concentration, and thereby 
have lost their international competitiveness. Also, it can be expected that the 
recent institutional changes, of the enforcement of the stewardship code and the 
corporate governance code, rather than emphasizing profit for companies as a whole, 
will provide important opportunities for management that emphasizes return on 







 (1) See, Rumelt (1984), Weirnerfelt (1984), Barney (1986), and Collis and Montgomery (1998). 
 (2) For survey, see Gertner and Scharfstein (2013). 
 (3) Goold and Cambell (1998) explain the trap of seeking synergy as CEO’s cognitive problem. 
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